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Abstract
Is steering still a viable concept? The article answers this question with a conditional yes. On the one hand, its conceptual
core remains intact. Getting others—who are considered to be idiosyncratic—to solve rather than pose societal problems
is no less relevant for recent governance analyses. On the other, steering as a concept needs some updates in terms of
subjects, objects, and ways of steering. Beyond merely extending the list of possible subjects and objects of steering, the
concept of irritation design is proposed. It stresses that making communication hard to ignore can be a matter of design.
Modern society seems to be crowded with steering entities, many of which displaying smart irritation designs. This leads
to complex constellations. Yet it remains valuable to analyze strategies of influence because despite all dynamics and hap‐
penstance, different chances of impact correlate with different irritation design. Still, we have to account for two aspects:
1) Capacities (beyond money or power) needed for designing irritations are unequally distributed; 2) material effects and
empirical boundaries have their share in a decreased ignorability.
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1. Introduction
The governance paradigm has replaced steering theory
(Bora, 2017). It questioned whether especially systems‐
theoretical design thinking “is still relevant to today’s
governance discourse and corresponding empirical ana‐
lyses or, as a ‘sunken cultural asset,’ belongs more to the
spectrum of the history of ideas” (Lange, 2007, p. 176,
author’s translation). Leaving uncommented whether
the history of ideas could nevertheless be a place worth
existing for concepts, the contribution at hand rather
focuses on the question whether differentiation theoret‐
ical thinking can add something to understand current
attempts at solving grand societal problems, such as envi‐
ronmental issues.
Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) is trying to
strike a balance by using systems‐theoretical design
thinking and governance concepts complementarily.
Inter alia, the paradigm change towards governance was
claimed to be due to the growing importance of ever
more players having a stake in collectively binding deci‐
sions. This adaptation to empirical conditions comes at a
price which EGT aptly coined: “Part of the complexity is
that other players anticipate each other’s strategies, the
direction of a collective strategy, and after enactment,
do not stop strategizing” (Van Assche et al., 2020, p. 5).
Thus, there are more players as well as elaborated sets
of strategies which even take into account an environ‐
ment full of other strategizing players. Instead of just
calling this complexity and abandoning concepts of con‐
trol, EGT remains interested in strategies. A strategy is
defined as “a vision for a desirable longer‐term future,
coupled to an idea of how to get there” (Van Assche
et al., 2020, p. 2). The contribution at hand proposes
the concept of irritation design to systematically describe
such ideas. The claim is: different degrees of effective‐
ness or chances of influence correlate with different irri‐
tation designs.
It starts by introducing a result special to differenti‐
ation theory: to conceive of societal differentiation as a
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cause for major societal problems as well as a reason for
problems in tackling those issues (Section 2). The loss of
a societal center of steering is one huge obstacle from
this perspective. An even more severe aspect could be
that such grand problems do not translate into action
seamlessly. In order to become socially relevant, societal
consequences have to be transformed from an irritation
into information. As this observation is no less valid as
in times preceding governance theory, the article does
not conceive of differentiation theory as an outdated
concept. Yet this leaves open whether this also applies
to steering.
There are other authors, sharing a systems‐
theoretical point of view, who are no longer interested in
steering, but propose to direct the view to ‘responsivity,’
i.e., to observe how autonomous systems respond to
grand societal problems their environment poses. In this
view, systems cause the need for correction and take
over the correction of such self‐produced problems. This
perspective will be discussed under the heading of ‘auto‐
correcting society’ (Section 3).
Briefly summarizing three decades of differentiation
theoretical steering concepts, Section 4 discusses differ‐
ent subjects, objects, and ways of steering. By focusing
on how communications are prepared to make them
hardly ignorable, irritation design goes beyond the pre‐
vious literature. This concept is further illustrated along
the three dimensions of meaning (factual, social, and
temporal; Section 5).
In accordance with EGT, Section 6 concludes that it
is worthwhile to focus on strategies and not to exclu‐
sively look for systemic responses toward grand societal
problems. Another aspect that the concept of irritation
design might benefit from is EGT’s emphasis on the dis‐
tinction between material and discursive effects. On the
one hand, an ever‐smarter irritation design by evermore
entities might explain modern society’s stability or iner‐
tia. On the other, we have to take into account that the
ability to stimulate others to translate is unequally dis‐
tributed in world society.
2. Differentiation as Correction Cause and Correction
Problem
This contribution’s first thesis is that steering deals with
two different kinds of societal consequences of func‐
tional differentiation. The first one refers to “the incor‐
rigible operational autonomy” of functional systems:
The best known is certainly the failure of the world
economic system to cope with the problem of the
just distribution of wealth….By focusing on schools
and universities, the education system leads young
people to spend far too long hanging around in
institutions of higher education to improve career
prospects, when they could long since have been
married and in productive employment. Through the
political parties, the political system attracts people
into politics who then, merely because they have
to keep busy, bestow unaffordable blessings on the
nation. The expectations set in intimate relationships
(under the heading of marriage for love) are now so
heightened—because motives are, after all, needed
for getting involved—that the ensuing marriages
keep the therapists and divorce courts busy, and new
attempts are frequent. (Luhmann, 2013, p. 124)
This means that a system’s exclusive attention to its
own processes has led to challenging consequences for
themselves, but also, and at the same time, for society.
Differentiation, specialization, and a focus on high per‐
formance equipped systemswith blinkers that kept them
from considering such societal consequences. As a result,
corresponding societal environments can be “seen only
as irritating noise, as disturbances or opportunities”
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 66).
Luhmann distinguishes a second problem area that
affects the environmental relations of society: ecological
problems. Rather casually, an enlightening shift is tak‐
ing place here. For it is no longer just a matter of dif‐
ferentiation as the cause of these problems, but rather
of differentiation as an explanation for the difficulties
in dealing with them, especially the lack of a central
societal authority, it operates without apex or center
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 125). Before dealing with societal
problems such as environmental pollution there has to
be a transformation of irritations into information, which
is the task of each functional system (Luhmann, 2013,
p. 126). Luhmann concedes that economy, science, or
politics could be imposed to orient on such problems,
especially if addressed by mass media or protest move‐
ments. But even successful imposition would not change
the fact that each system reacted in its very own way:
“politics rhetorically, the economy by raising prices, sci‐
ence with research projects, which with every advance
in knowledge reveal still more ignorance” (Luhmann,
2013, p. 127).
The processing issue of both of Luhmann’s prob‐
lems due to functional differentiation’s societal
consequences—the formation of blinkers of systemic
stubbornness and the lack of a central authority in envi‐
ronmental questions—is thus primarily based on the
difference in functional systems’ information processing.
All irritations referring to societal problems only become
information through functional systemic transformation,
in this case then different information.
In terms of steering, there seems to be a crucial ques‐
tion: Can this transformation of irritations into informa‐
tion be triggered? Moreover, some accompanying ques‐
tions come up: Is the level of functional systems the
only relevant one? Who is irritating whom under what
conditions—and how? Before we can turn to these ques‐
tions, we have to acknowledge that there is a recent
trend in differentiation theory that points into the oppo‐
site direction. Instead of asking how systems might be
irritated, some scholars focus functional system’s own
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preparations for societal problems. Therefore, I propose
to call this development society’s auto‐correction.
3. The Auto‐Correction of Society
Claiming society’s auto‐correction to be a recent trend
might obscure that there have been corresponding con‐
tributions for a while. Dirk Baecker (1994) proposed to
think of ‘social work as a functional system’ (Soziale Hilfe
als Funktionssystem). He distinguishes between a pri‐
mary and a secondary society. The former means func‐
tional differentiation. A secondary society is the result
of functional differentiation and refers to the fact that
large sections of a population are only concerned with
survival, and that participation in the economy, poli‐
tics, education, religion, art, or science is in any case
blocked (Baecker, 1994, p. 95). Apparently, this diagno‐
sis refers primarily to modern society’s inclusion prob‐
lems. The same society now responds to these problems
by differentiating a functional system of social assistance.
Without the consequences of functional differentiation,
this system formation would not exist.
Correction phenomena are rather explained as the
result of functional differentiation than to ask for how
working on its consequences is stimulated: The function‐
ally differentiated society not only creates its own prob‐
lems; it also produces forms of correction that respond
to these problems.
Responsivity is the latest conceptual development
in this area. Rudolf Stichweh (2014, pp. 17–18) consid‐
ers autonomy and purity semantics (‘pure’ and ‘funda‐
mental’ science, ‘l’art pour l’art,’ etc.) and the forma‐
tion of a collective singular (e.g., the law, the economy,
etc.) to be essential for the beginning of differentia‐
tion processes. Formulas of autonomy and detachment
were sought and found until it became a matter of
course from the middle/end of the 18th century that sci‐
ence, for example, did not have to take other spheres
(above all: religion) into consideration. This was followed
by internal differentiation and thus a stabilization of
autonomy—the formation of disciplines in the case of sci‐
ence (Stichweh, 1992).
After this phase of interior orientation, however,
Stichweh (2014, pp. 17–18) identifies a ‘trend change.’
Functional systems, he argues, become responsive and
expansive. In this sense, they want to be effective and
important and they also want to be supported from the
outside. Accordingly, systems incorporated a multitude
of external perspectives, whose multiplicity was a guar‐
antor of autonomy. Other functional systems and soci‐
ety as a whole are identified as the most important ref‐
erence contexts (Stichweh, 2016, p. 11). It is understood
as a consequence of functional differentiation that the
functional systems themselves take major social prob‐
lems into account. Where the impetus for the develop‐
ment of responsive structures and mechanisms comes
from remains unresolved. Krichewsky (2021) asks for
how problem formulations emerge and refers to ways
of, and collectives involved in agenda‐setting. But the
identification and processing of problems encountered
in other functional spheres still becomes reconstructed
in terms of responsive systems, in his case as political
responsiveness, leaving irritations unconsidered.
Such approaches (‘auto‐correction of society’) seem
to conceive of functional differentiation as an infi‐
nite cycle of self‐produced problems and self‐produced
solutions related to them. Before the following sec‐
tion reverses the direction to focus on the stimulation
aspect, a third way appears: Problems impose them‐
selves physically.
Joren Jacobs and Kristof Van Assche (2014) pursue
this very line with the concept of ‘empirical boundaries.’
These are defined as “boundaries that function as bound‐
aries but do not originate in the internal semantics of the
observing system” (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014, p. 194).
Functional systems could, this is the conclusion, be irri‐
tated by spatial differences. ‘Hit the wall’ then denotes
themoment of an irritation by the impact of ‘hard bound‐
aries.’ The consequential problems discussed most thor‐
oughly by Luhmann, ecological hazards, are exemplary
here. For Jacobs and Van Assche, however, empirical
boundaries describe all obstacles that “may be produced
by the physical context without communication making
any explicit reference to this matter of fact by means of
boundary concepts. The empirical boundary… is a pre‐
social (or post‐social) boundary, existing in the environ‐
ment of society” (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014, p. 199).
Luhmann’s (1989, pp. 28–29) well‐known dictum thus
appears as half the truth:
Fish or humans may die because swimming in the
seas and rivers has become unhealthy. The oil‐pumps
may run dry and the average climatic temperatures
may rise or fall. As long as this is not the subject of
communication it has no social effect.
Where the environment does not impose itself (whether
ultimately as a result of social or natural evolution
remains to be seen), it only becomes a social phe‐
nomenon when it is communicated. But the other half
would then include the assumption that physical or
spatial aspects are able to impose themselves on a
thematization. Marcelo Neves (2017, p. 393) drastically
describes that social systems have a tendency to over‐
load their environment with garbage: “Not only in the
form of thewave of terrorism and global criminality does
the garbage come back, but also, and above all else,
through the uncontrollable refugee flows caused by war,
hunger and oppression.”
Even though this approach differs significantly in
the dimension just described from other concepts dis‐
cussed above, one common feature remains: Once again,
it is not a matter of imposing a social (i.e., commu‐
nicative) correction on society. The fact that exactly
this kind of stimulation is needed, that one cannot
rely on increased reflection capacities of autonomous
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systems, characterizes the following line of tradition of
differentiation‐theoretical steering concepts.
4. Beyond the Limits of Steering
One of the major obstacles posed by functional dif‐
ferentiation is that there is no central authority for
dealing with its societal consequences. This configura‐
tion is worsened by a systemic autonomy that leads
to the fact that every irritation pointing to social prob‐
lems must be transformed into system‐specific informa‐
tion. Luhmann’s consequence was to emphasize “limits
of steering.” He defines steering as “a very specific
use of distinctions, namely the attempt to reduce the
difference” (Luhmann, 1997, p. 43). In order to move
the economy closer to a politically preferred state, for
instance, the political system can prohibit something,
it can create costs, or the like. “When closely examin‐
ing these possibilities one will probably establish that
in most cases the point is to interfere in the relative
attraction of the programmes” (Luhmann, 1997, p. 53).
In short, a translation of originally political conditions
into business‐specific programs is likely if it (literally)
pays off economically—if it is relatively attractive. In this
case, however, it is still an economic program and this
does not coincide with the political one. In the best case,
both benefit: Politics can show success if pollutant lev‐
els improve after the implementation of a corresponding
regulation and this is reflected in increasing voter favor.
The economy can also score, for example if a company
can strengthen its market position by presenting itself
as a particularly green producer and this manifests itself
in sales figures. Significantly, however, Luhmann (1997,
p. 53) continues his argumentation in the opposite direc‐
tion. Environmental regulations could also lead to the
bankruptcy of certain companies. It is in this respect that
this article aims to push the limits of steering.
In doing so, it joins the neighborhood of other
authors who thought in a more constructive way about
steering under the condition of functional differentia‐
tion. If operational autonomy and idiosyncratic informa‐
tion processing hinder dealing with the consequences
of functional differentiation, reflection could be the key
(Teubner & Willke, 1984). With regard to dealing with
functional differentiation’s consequences, HelmutWillke
(1992, p. 374) put forward that reflection:
Induces actors to realize that they cannot avoid being
possible (that is: viable) environments of other sys‐
tems. Reflecting this, systems may decide to restrict
the range of their options to the few or even to
the single one which complies with the conditions
of productive—or at least non‐destructive—system‐
environment‐ecology.
Thereby,Willke specified steering (in his translation: guid‐
ance) in terms of an attempt to reduce a certain dif‐
ference, namely reducing options to those complying
with the system‐environment‐ecology. In other words,
autonomous systems should be made to be a viable
environment for other systems, and thus also to meet
the overall system/environment interplay. But this is
not expected to just happen or to be the next stage of
functional differentiation, as the concept of responsivity
assumes. Rather, this viewmust be the result of an irrita‐
tion that was transformed into an information. There are
countless communications that surround systems. Only
a tiny fraction of it succeeds to become an irritation that
is transformed into information. Consequently, it is even
more unlikely for this information to stimulate a reflec‐
tion which then, again, leads to productive (or at least
non‐destructive) outputs. What these remarks clearly
show is that everything beginswith an irritation. Systems‐
theoretical accounts continued this debate by asking
who irritates whom in what way.
4.1. The Who (Subjects of Steering)
In the beginning, reflexive law is considered to be
best equipped to provide mechanisms and procedures
to induce reflection. Willke continues his thoughts by
viewing the political system as a primus inter pares
and in form of the ‘supervision state’ (Willke, 1997)
or in terms of ‘lateral world systems’ (Willke, 2007).
In his latest account, he proposes ‘reflexive represen‐
tation’ (Willke, 2019): Special problems become dele‐
gated by elected parliaments to special senates made
up of experts, e.g., central banks or regulatory agencies.
Although the political system remains in charge, Willke
(2014, p. 158; author’s translation) recognizes a lot of
helping hands: “Citizens’ movements, committed NGOs,
ecologically and sustainably oriented foundations, think
tanks, expert committees and related institutions that
think and act beyond national borders and are able to
recognize and deal with global problems.”
Teubner, too, embraces the extension of possible and
already visible subjects of steering. He does not leave it
at adding further players but emphasizes: “In no way are
these extralegal mechanisms inferior to legal sanctions”
(Teubner, 2011a, p. 37). In a globalized and digitalized
world, steering theory should be aware that “societal
forces are more relevant than nation states. Civil societal
countervailing forces—the media, public debate, spon‐
taneous protest, intellectuals, social movements, NGOs,
trade unions, professions—exert considerable pressure
on the internal constitutionalisation of transnational
regimes” (Teubner, 2013, p. 51), their power pressures
have proven to be crucial (Teubner, 2011a, p. 37).
At the beginning of systems‐theoretical steering con‐
cepts, responsibility was clearly assigned to politics
and/or law. Also due to the conditions of globaliza‐
tion and digitization, this clarity has given way to a
much broader spectrum. But the fundamental ques‐
tion remains the same: How can stubborn systems be
brought to reflection?With regard to the objects of steer‐
ing, however, the tendency is more towards a narrowing.
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4.2. The Whom (Objects of Steering)
We also witness a remarkable shift regarding whose
decisions are conceived of as most detrimental for
the system‐environment‐ecology. In the beginning of
systems‐theoretical concepts of steering, it is all about
self‐referential systems in general. When it comes to
examples, it is striking that it is expected that the
objects of steering might strike (respectively: steer) back.
On the one hand, the political welfare system can hardly
escape the pressure to intervene in practically all societal
domains (family, schooling, science, traffic, home build‐
ing, energy consumption, etc.). “But also, the economy
or religion, military, health, technology or other systems
try hard to guide societal processes in an effort to inten‐
tionally change their respective societal environment in
a preferred direction” (Willke, 1992, p. 374).
René Marcic, an Austrian philosopher of law,
remarked as early as 1970 that in:
A constitutional state, everyone controls everyone
else….Not only ‘state powers’ but also other social
powers are kept under control. This is a major prob‐
lem of the contemporary state. Yes, even individual,
particularly well‐developed personalities, wealthy
people or otherwise influential private individuals
can exercise ‘power’ andmust be controlled. (Marcic,
1970, p. 182; author’s translation)
His list of possible controllers beyond the state—
business associations, the scientific community, the
church, the media of public opinion: press, radio, tele‐
vision, film, theater, cabaret—resembles Teubner’s enu‐
meration of civil societal countervailing forces. Whereas
there is a consensus towards an extension on the subject
side, we find an interesting focus on one societal context
on the object side: The economy, to be precise, transna‐
tional corporations (Teubner, 2011a, 2011b). These are
assumed to be particularlymyopic and leading to extraor‐
dinary harmful societal consequences—which became
even more visible after the last big financial crisis (Kjaer
et al., 2011).
If we stick to the intuition that steering is a concept
worth pursuing, it seems advisable to do both: 1) look
for which societal context shows the deepest impact
on the system‐environment ecology; and 2) be open
for possible objects of steering on any level and type
of differentiation. In his pragmatist differentiation the‐
ory of translations, Joachim Renn (2006) proposes to
add “integrative units” (Fuchs, 2009) underneath the
abstract levels of functional systems and organizations,
namely milieus and persons in terms of cultural differ‐
entiation. This leads to the assumption of a multiply
differentiated society, meaning that there is functional
as well as cultural differentiation which cannot be inte‐
grated by the means of one single type of coordination
be it abstract‐systemic or concrete‐cultural. In a nutshell
and with regard to the subject at hand, this means that
even if an irritation is transformed into information by a
functional system, it has to be re‐specified by organiza‐
tions. Within an organization, milieu’s, and person’s hori‐
zons interfere in concrete situations, translating the very
abstract information coming from the level of functional
systems. As an example, we might think of authorities or
administrations with public access. Consider a law that
directs compliance with climate targets, but then must
be implemented in an administration by staff from a par‐
ticular milieu and with a certain horizon of experience.
This type of translation is called re‐specification (Besio
& Meyer, 2015). Yet this process can take the other way
around, starting in a concrete situation, maybe initiated
by a single person, to become an explicit, standardized
rule that organizationsmay increasingly generalize. But a
cascade of translations can be expected in this direction
as well. Multiple differentiation thus implies account‐
ing for multiple subjects as well as objects of steering.
In this perspective, civil societal countervailing forces are
only a small part of the picture. In Marcic’s terms this
constellation—everyone controls everyone else—is the
best a constitutional state can get. Pragmatist differentia‐
tion theory systematizes this ‘everyone’ into four integra‐
tive units: persons, milieus, organizations, or functional
systems. We will revisit this in Section 5.
4.3. The How (Ways of Steering)
Finally, it does not come as a surprise that more than
three decades of working on this particular perspec‐
tive on steering also discussed different ways of mak‐
ing idiosyncratic systems reflect. When the law and the
political system were seen in charge, it was searched for
mechanisms andprocedures, such as round tables. In any
case, it seemed clear that they had to be interactions.
Again, taking into account the conditions of world
society and media change led to a remarkable shift, this
time with regard to the medium of steering attempts, in
short: from face‐to‐face interactions to media‐diffused
communication. Especially if the target is to force
transnational corporations to adapt their programs to
be a viable environment, Teubner (2011a, p. 19) consid‐
ers “the heavy public criticism globally disseminated by
the media and the aggressive actions of protest move‐
ments and civil society, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs)” to be superior to the public codes of the state
world. Reputation and ‘public credibility’ (Ku, 2000) are
valuable currencies.
If the major objects of steering—entities following
purely economic imperatives—can escape national laws
by settling elsewhere, other means are required. This
makes the shift towards public pressure as an essential
source of irritation understandable. Summarizing these
developments, there are many possible ways for many
subjects to try to steer many objects. Yet there is one
thing that remains unchanged: If it is all about making
others reflect that continuing established routines can be
disastrous for systems themselves as well as their social
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and natural environment, this has to start with an irrita‐
tion. This does not mean to decide whether interactions
or publicity rather bear reflexive capacities but to show
a general interest in the process of making others reflect
(Mölders, 2014, 2019).Moreover, neither any interactive
format nor any type of publicity will equally suit this tar‐
get. These differences call for considering design. And of
course, opting for interaction or publication is not an
aspect of choice for any irritating body. It may be easier
than ever to publish communications. However, that is
not equally true for getting the attention of sites deemed
most relevant (Mölders & Schrape, 2019).
The review of the development to the How‐question
can end here because this exact question is in the cen‐
ter of the now to be introduced concept of irritation
design. This is still concerned with sounding out the pos‐
sibility of steering without believing in direct transmis‐
sions without translation. What is new in this respect is,
on the one hand, to focus on irritation as a necessary and
formable first step and, on the other hand, to illuminate
‘irritators’ who already reckon with the impossibility of
direct intervention.
5. Designing Irritations
If we stick to the postulate that autonomous systems
can only be stimulated tomake sense of communications
that point to a change, the concept of irritation is at play:
In order to be open to irritation, meaning structures
are built to form expectation horizons, which count
on redundancies, hence with repetition of the same
in other situations. Irritations are then registered in
the form of disappointed expectations. Positive and
negative… surprises can be involved. On both cases
it is a matter, on the one hand, of momentary incon‐
sistencies, which can also be forgotten; one sees the
consequences or represses them. On the other hand,
irritation can also assert its own repeatability and on
this level runs counter to the expectation structures
of the system. (Luhmann, 2013, p. 117)
This quote does not say anything about which charac‐
teristics communications must show in order to work
as an irritation. From a constructivist perspective, there
seems to be no other way; irritation is the condition of
a different system, therefore there is no such thing as a
direct intervention. However, the puzzling formulation is
noticeable, irritations could assert their own repeatabil‐
ity. As puzzling as this statement may seem, it must be
cases in which it becomes more difficult for a focused
system to treat such communications as merely momen‐
tary inconsistencies. Exactly this is the anchor point for
the concept of irritation design: to orientate communi‐
cations at the expectation, to make it as difficult as pos‐
sible for the addressee, to fade them out as situational
and ignorable. How this can bemademore difficult is the
moment of designability.
In principle, corrections can start at any point in
a translation cascade—persons, milieus, organizations,
and functional systems. But sooner or later, correction
requests endupon the attention screens of organizations.
It need not stop at this principled argument. Instead, it
can be argued that it is organizations where translation
work is done. Besio and Meyer (2015) even argue that it
is precisely organizations that mediate between different
logics and can thus cushion differentiation consequences.
External influences are segregated, filtered, and assimi‐
lated by organizations, which is addressed by the term
re‐specification introduced earlier. In this way, they make
the incoming environment readable for themselves and,
in turn, change and shape their environment.
The pragmatist differentiation theory calls organi‐
zations ‘distribution heads’ (Verteilerköpfe). In them,
functional‐systemic imperatives are worked into small
pieces; in the opposite direction, it is organizations
that ensure that impulses put forward by individuals or
milieus are translated in a systemically generalizing way.
This speaks for a special position of organizations for
steering theory. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise
that the exemplary sketches of the next sections all refer
to organizations.
5.1. Three Dimensions of Meaning: Factual, Social,
Temporal
The moment of repeatability already points to the tem‐
poral dimension. Timing seems to be an obvious aspect.
If there is a massive global event, say, Olympics or the
World Economic Forum, it may make sense to wait—
or, which belongs into the factual dimension, to con‐
nect a potentially irritating communication to this event.
In very rare cases, one‐off‐communications succeed.
It seems more promising to be persistent while not bor‐
ing, which meant to be easily ignorable, again. As ‘grand
challenges’—such as the societal consequences of func‐
tional differentiation—are there to stay, any sort of solu‐
tion that combines persistence with variation seems
reasonable. For investigative journalism, to give an exam‐
ple of a recent countervailing force, this gets visible in
cases of big leaks. As it is almost impossible to publish
everything at once, journalistic consortia or comparable
organizations may make a virtue of necessity by remind‐
ing of a topic at certain time intervals. This runs counter
to the usual way of processing information inmedia orga‐
nizations, to publish something as soon as possible and
as long as it is a novelty, i.e., an information. Modern
media ease to do that in a more interesting way, some‐
thing might be best suitable for a podcast, for a blog, for
a magazine, etc. Yet irritation design along the temporal
dimension also means to account for the temporality of
the focused system or addressee. For the political realm
thismightmean to synchronize one’s ownmessageswith
election terms or the like.
In terms of the factual dimension, it seems rea‐
sonable to think of what Conversation Analysis coined
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‘recipient design’ (Sacks et al., 1974). This refers to com‐
pose communications along the expectation of what
could be intelligible or readable for a focused addressee.
We may associate this with attempts at translating one’s
own language into another, e.g., from a mass media lan‐
guage into a political dictionary. But we may also think
of presenting communication in a way that is easier to
digest. In order to convince lawmakers from limiting the
power of big tech platforms, as investigative data jour‐
nalist Julia Angwin from the tech watchdog organiza‐
tion The Markup puts it, one has to translate big data
into ‘small data,’ i.e., providing them with concrete evi‐
dence of wrongdoing (Schwab, 2018). Teubner’s (2020,
p. 17) remark that irritations can also be aimed at the
recognition of added or surplus values extends into the
factual dimension, too. Such communications could, for
instance, consider what is assumed to establish rather
than to undermine public credibility.
How to reach lawmakers, is a crucial question for an
irritation design that aims atmaking an addressee reflect
to restrict the range of options to the few or even to the
single one that an irritator sees in accordance with the
common good. The way to get there leads to the social
dimension of meaning. In this sense, structural couplings
denote the ideal form (Luhmann, 2013, pp. 108–115).
They are such firmly established intersystemic channels
of interference that one can speak of “regular irritations”
(Amstutz, 2013, p. 383). Communications can be relied
upon to be delivered. The processing of scientific advice,
for example, is then still subject to the filtering rules of
politics. For journalism, for instance, there is no direct
way to talk lawmakers into preferred changes. Therefore,
they choose the medium of publicity to exert pressure,
i.e., to make their communications hard to ignore. If the
direct way is blocked, it must be about finding the short‐
est detour. Therefore, it can be of particular importance
to find out what (public) communicative places a target
(system) usually consults if in a state of uncertainty or just
in search of valuable information. For some lawmakers,
thismight be a local newspaperwith comparatively small
print run, for judges this might refer to legal comments
or journals. Furthermore, the social dimension can ask
for who is considered to be a valuable coalition partner.
Thismight be publication partners or persons sharing the
same milieu as a relevant decision‐maker.
All of this must not disqualify procedures taking the
form of face‐to‐face interactions. Although not an option
available to everyone, some entities can try to talk oth‐
ers into reflection in the above defined sense. Michael
Hutter shed light on the microlevel of such formats.
He notes that attracting attention of a self‐referential
entity means to find messages which become valuable
information: “New information implies that the screen
of the communicating system has to be conditioned
in a way which makes it receptive to available new
messages. Only the response of another system shows
whether the attempt has been successful” (Hutter, 1992,
pp. 271–273).
Making others reflect to choose an option not picked
voluntarily, is obviously a tough business. The argument
made in the preceding chapter does not mean to cast
doubt on these difficulties but to acknowledge that irrita‐
tion can be systematized not least by taking into account
different temporalities and meaning processing rules.
Because this is conceptually possible as well as empir‐
ically observable, the term irritation design was pro‐
posed. This concept is also suitable for explaining dif‐
ferent chances of influence, e.g., when an irritation was
incomprehensible, premature, or not even ‘deliverable.’
The concluding chapter will show that this solution sheds
light on new problems, too.
6. Conclusions
The contribution at hand started by proposing steer‐
ing to be an answer to the question how the soci‐
etal consequences of functional differentiation could be
tackled—and how this can be observed. Differentiation
was claimed to be both, a cause of major societal prob‐
lems as well as a major problem of working on them.
If differentiation is displayed in many different kinds of
information processing, it becomes clear that any com‐
munication that aims at working on such problems gets
translated in very different ways and with very differ‐
ent consequences.
Therefore, some differentiation theoretical contribu‐
tions turn the table and propose to rather look at sys‐
tems’ responses to problems originating elsewhere in
society (without having been forced to). Because of the
underlying assumption that systems start to work on
problems caused by themselves, this line of research
was called the auto‐correction of society. In contrast
to this, the point of departure for steering theory has
always been that problems worsen if it is relied on sys‐
tems’ autonomy. The major question being how to make
autonomous entities reflect to keep an eye on ‘the big
picture.’ Explicitly, the assumption is that systems, at
least, have to be triggered to do so.
To resurrect steering as a valuable concept, some
means of modernization seem to be due. We have to
account for several subjects of steering beyond the legal
and the political system, be it from civil society, phi‐
lanthropy, or a Fifth Estate in terms of networked cit‐
izens exerting pressure spontaneously, even disappear‐
ing when the issue is settled (Dutton et al., 2015, p. 19).
Regarding the objects of steering, it seems advisable to
assume many powerful instances of different sizes (from
single persons to whole systems). If everyone controls
everyone else (Marcic, 1970), things become ever more
dynamic and therefore harder to control. Many steering
subjects seem to be aware of that but to stop strategiz‐
ing is not considered an option. It does not seem exag‐
gerated to claim a ‘control society’ fueled by the rise of
Big Data in terms of finding patterns in huge amounts
of data which exceeds by far personal and organizational
capacities (Elish & boyd, 2018; Trish, 2018).
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Therefore, it seemed plausible to put forward the
notion of irritation design and to focus on aspects of strat‐
egy. Even though autonomous addressees might only be
irritated and never reached directly, making information
more or less hard to ignore—this has been the bottom
line—can be an aspect of design. While this might hold
true for public relations or related sorts of strategic com‐
munication, too, the relation to steering comes in when‐
ever an irritation design is led by the (regulative) idea
to positively promote only those options out of an array
of contingent possibilities that take into account future
necessities, prerequisites or possibilities which comply
with the conditions of the system‐environment‐ecology
(Willke, 1992).
This emphasis on strategy is a shared concern for both
EGT and the concept of irritation design. The latter is
interested in communicative means able to trigger the
transformation of irritations into information. Yet it can
hardly be overseen that there are material effects which
concern changes in the physical environment that seem
to trigger communications (Van Assche et al., 2020, p. 6).
Distinguishing between material and discursive effects is
essential for the EGTperspective (VanAssche et al., 2014).
The concept of irritation design stresses that problems
do not draw attention to themselves automatically (or:
naturally). Making others deal with problems (as big as
the societal consequences of functional differentiation)
is not left to chance alone but can be an aspect of design.
Leaning on EGT, it can learn to be sensitive with regard
to both directions: Not to underestimate the (organiza‐
tional) work of making others reflect but also to consider
the relevance of what EGT calls ‘material effects.’
Control attempts already expect the control attempts
of others and this reciprocal permanent observation
would lead in the result to a far‐reaching stabilization
of present conditions. This implies a continuation of the
systems‐theoretical steering pessimism described at the
beginning,which is notwhatwe are aiming at here.What
seems certain, though, is that no solution will prevail
without irritation design. Even a supposedly irresistible
solution idea does not flow barrier‐free to implementa‐
tion but has to pass through numerous translation stages.
Viewed in this light, it seems hardly surprising that arti‐
cles advocating the enforcement of technical solutions
to address climate change, such as direct air capture, are
at the very same time already considering methods of
political persuasion (Hanna et al., 2021).
Further research should take into account that the
capacity to stimulate others to translate is unequally dis‐
tributed in the world society (Renn, 2006, p. 497). This
inequality has not only to dowith differences in power or
money, but above all with how decisions aremade about
the use of power and money. The example of large‐scale
philanthropic organizations illustrates this particularly
well (Mölders, 2020). Here, projects are monitored in
such a targeted manner and their re‐specification is con‐
trolled so systematically that the frequently described
impacts of ‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Bishop & Green, 2015)
cannot be explained by power or money alone, but
as an organizational effect (Mair & Hehenberger, 2014;
Reiser, 2018).
Moreover, it seems worthwhile to compare different
irritation designs, e.g., along different societal contexts
(science, arts, economy, religion, etc.), different guid‐
ing principles (evidence‐based, technocratic, communi‐
tarian, etc.) or types of collectives (Dolata & Schrape,
2018). All this also speaks in favor of taking an interest
in strategies. It is easy to hint at strategies failing their
targets. But this should not lead to overlooking impacts
strategies—smart irritation designs—have.
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